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This study examines the components of trading costs incurred in trading large and liquid stocks listed on the
Stock Exchange of Thailand. We find that aggressive orders pay an immediacy price measured by price impact,
whereas executed passive orders gain the immediacy price. We also find a sizable opportunity cost from the
unexecuted portion of a limit order that more than offsets the benefit obtained from the partial fulfillment of
the order. The total trading cost, which includes price impact and opportunity cost, is positively related to
order size and stock price volatility, but negatively associated with firm size, stock price, and stock liquidity.
The total trading cost has a U-shaped relation with order aggressiveness. Collectively, our study suggests that,
tominimize the total trading cost, the optimal strategy is simply to use a limit order submitted at the best quote.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this study, we analyze trading costs incurred by market- and
limit-order traders and compare the costs of different order submission
strategies. We also examine the relationship between the associated
trading costs and stock/order characteristics. Previous studies3 that
use transactional data such as NYSE TAQ focus on trading costs incurred
by only traders who initiate trades. The studies implicitly assume that
trade initiators pay trading costs proxied by the effective half spread
for demanding immediacy, and liquidity suppliers such as limit order
traders gain the effective spread by supplying immediacy.4 However,
limit order traders incur implicit cost these studies do not take into
account. Because the order execution is not guaranteed as in the case
of market orders, limit orders face a non-execution risk (Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz, & Whitcomb, 1981). The non-execution risk exposes limit
order traders to opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is incurred when a
portion of a limit order is unfilled and subsequently filled at an unfavor-
able price (Handa & Schwartz, 1996; Liu, 2009; Perold, 1988; Wagner &
Edwards, 1993).5 Therefore, it is important to take the opportunity cost
into account when measuring the total trading cost of a limit order.
In order to quantify the opportunity cost faced by limit order traders,
detailed data beyond the trade and quote (TAQ) are required. In this
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study, we obtain proprietary order-level data that contain information
on all orders submitted to the Stock Exchange of Thailand in our sample
period. The full detailed order-level data allow us to reconstruct the
order book and to quantify the full trading costs incurred by traders
using either limit or market orders. Because the data provide the exact
time for submission of an order, a more accurate characterization of
the true cost of trading6 is possible than it would otherwise be from
using TAQ data, where only the best quotes and executed trades are
available. According to Bessembinder (2003) and Peterson and Sirri
(2003), the mid-point quote at the time of order submission is a more
appropriate benchmark for measuring the trading cost than the mid-
point price at the time of order execution. Therefore, information on
the timing of an order submission mitigates such estimation biases
resulted from an inappropriate benchmark. More importantly, the
quantity of a stock sought in an order can be considered an ex ante
quantity as opposed to the quantity of stock traded, which is an ex
post quantity. Specifically, it is possible to evaluate and quantify the
two types of cost of an order using information from the ex ante quanti-
ty, i.e., the cost of the filled portion as well as the (opportunity) cost of
the unfilled portion of an order.
The result of this study confirms that the total trading cost measured
by implementation shortfall has a U-shaped relation with order aggres-
siveness. The most aggressive and the least aggressive orders have the
highest implementation shortfall; and the limit orders submitted at the
best quotes have the lowest implementation shortfall. The U-shaped
relationship between implementation shortfall and order aggressiveness
is expected because the implementation shortfall is the sum of price
impact and opportunity cost. The aggressive order such as market
order incurs higher price impact, while the less aggressive order such
as limit order suffersmore opportunity cost of not transacting. Therefore,
the implementation shortfall is not linear to the order aggressiveness
because price impact and opportunity cost have opposite relation with
order aggressiveness. In addition, we document the relationship be-
tween stock/order characteristics and cost of trading. The total trading
cost proxied by implementation shortfall is positively correlated to
order size and volatility; and it is negatively associated to firm size,
stock price, and stock liquidity proxied by trading value. The patterns
on the price impact and the opportunity cost are conditional on the
order types. The price impact of market orders is higher for large orders,
small firm stocks, low priced stocks, stocks with high volatility, and
stocks with low liquidity. As expected, the opposite is true for limit
orders. The opportunity cost of limit orders is higher for small firm
stocks, low priced stocks, stocks with high volatility, and stocks with
low liquidity. Finally, we propose an optimal trading strategy for traders
who wish to minimize their total trading cost. The optimal trading
strategy is to use a limit order submitted at the best quote, i.e., use a
buy limit order submitted at the best bid or a sell limit order submitted
at the best ask. The average total cost of trading that includes the price
impact and the opportunity cost using this strategy is merely 0.02% of
the order value in our sample period.
This study provides a comprehensive examination of trading cost
using large and liquid stocks on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The
finding contributes to the finance literature in the following ways.
First, the study is the pioneer to utilize implementation shortfall
proposed by Perold (1988) as a measure of total trading cost in a pure
order-driven market. Most of the existing studies focus on hybrid or
quote-driven market such as NYSE, NASDAQ, and Toronto Stock
Exchange. We fill this gap by employing a proprietary data from
the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Second, no previous studies have inves-
tigated the total trading cost in a developing market. We find that
the firm size cross-sectional variation of trading cost as well as the
contribution of price impact and opportunity cost toward the total trad-
ing cost is similar to prior findings in developed markets. Third, our
study provides further evidence on the cross-sectional variation of trad-
ing cost on order characteristics and stock characteristics than prior
studies. We provide systematic and comprehensive evidence on not
only the cross-sectional variation of total trading cost, but also the
cross-sectional dynamics of price impact and opportunity cost. Specifi-
cally, ours is the first study in the literature to document the trading
cost variation on stock return volatility and the cross-sectional variation
on trading costs conditional on order aggressiveness. Fourth, we show
the importance of opportunity cost in order submission. Ignoring
opportunity cost underestimates the total cost of trading especially for
the less aggressive limit order with lower filled rate. More importantly,
lacking this knowledge may lead to a wrong trading decision and favor
less aggressive orders with low price impact but high opportunity cost.
Finally, we propose a cost-effective trading strategy based on our
finding. The optimal strategy for a trader, who wants to minimize the
total trading cost, is to use a limit order submitted at the best quote. In
summary, we provide a deeper understanding of the nature, determi-
nants, and characteristics of total trading costs in a pure order-driven
market. We believe that this study is of interest to regulators, policy
makers, brokers, and individual as well as institutional traders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a literature review and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes
the institutional background of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, the
proprietary data employed, and trading cost measurement. Sections 4
and 5 discuss empirical results and provide additional robustness
checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Trading cost is one of the most heavily researched areas in market
microstructure. However, the focus of the research varies. Harris and
Hasbrouck (1996) and Peterson and Sirri (2002) compare the spreads
for different order types (market vs. limit orders) placed through the
NYSE SuperDOT system. Cooney and Sias (2004) and Werner (2003)
investigate spreads for orders placed through different channels
(electronics system, floor broker, and specialist) in the NYSE. Griffiths,
Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000), and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996)
examine trading costs of orders with different aggressiveness. A large
number of studies, including Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997a,
1997b) and Huang and Stoll (2001), compares trading cost between
NYSE and NASDAQ.7 There is another strand of study that investigates
the institutional trading cost (Chan & Lakonishok, 1997; Chiyachantana
et al., 2004; Keim & Madhavan, 1997, 1998; Wagner & Edwards, 1993).
Recently, Lee (2011) estimates trading cost for 50 countries in his
liquidity-adjusted asset pricing study.
A trader needs to decide the type of order to place when he trades
shares. A market order demands immediacy from the counterparty
and, therefore, incurs an implicit price of immediacy. On the other
hand, while a limit order does not pay for the price of the immediacy,
the order faces a non-execution risk and may end up being unfilled.
Conventional trading cost measures such as bid–ask spread and price
impact underestimate the cost for limit order because they ignore the
opportunity cost of not transacting. Perold (1988) develops implemen-
tation shortfall measure of transaction costs to capture the entire cost of
trading that includes both price impact cost for the executed portion of
an order and opportunity cost for unfilled portion of the same order. In
this study, we utilize implementation shortfall as the key measure of
total trading.
6 These costs are conceptually similar to costs computed by studies using order-level
data about institutional equity trades (e.g., Chan & Lakonishok, 1995, 1997;
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, & Wood, 2004; Keim & Madhavan, 1997).
7 Other studies, e.g., Bennett and Wei (2006) and Boehmer (2005), compare trading
cost betweenNYSE andNASDAQ. Venkataraman (2001) compares trading cost across Par-
is Bourse and NYSE.
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2.1. Determinants of total trading cost
Prior research such as Chiyachantana et al. (2004), Keim and
Madhavan (1998), and Wagner and Edwards (1993) documents a
number of factors that affect spreads and, by association, trading costs.
In this study, we classify these factors into two main categories. The
first category ismade up from a trader's trading decision that comprises
order size and order aggressiveness. The second category consists of
stock characteristics that are unrelated to a trader's decision. These
factors include firm-size measured by market capitalization, stock
return volatility, and stock liquidity. In this section, we hypothesize
the cross-sectional difference in trading cost on trader's decision and
stock characteristics.
According to Griffiths et al. (2000), an aggressive order is expected
to pay a higher price impact cost than a passive order because of the
demand for immediacy. However, an aggressive order incurs very little
or no opportunity cost since the order is almost fully executed immedi-
ately upon submission. On the other hand, a limit order incurs opportu-
nity cost because, inwhole or in part, the ordermay remain unfilled. Our
first hypothesis is:
H1. Price impact is positively correlated to the aggressiveness level of
an order.
The total cost of trading is affected by the size of order. In their
theoretical work, Easley and O'Hara (1987) show that a large order
incurs a higher trading cost. The prediction is empirically studied by
Keim and Madhavan (1997, 1998) using institutional equity trades.
They find that larger trades incur higher trading cost in terms of
commission cost and price impact. For a limit order, as the size of the
order increases, it becomes more difficult for the order to be filled.
This leads to a higher opportunity cost (i.e., the cost of the need to even-
tually transact the unfilled portions, usually at unfavorable prices). For a
limit order, opportunity cost forms the bulk of total cost; therefore, a
larger order size of the limit order should incur a higher total trading
cost. This leads us to the second hypothesis:
H2. Total trading cost is positively correlated to order size.
The trading cost is also affected by firm size and stock price.
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997a), and Keim and Madhavan (1997,
1998) find that the trading cost for large-cap stocks is less than those
for small-cap stocks. Similarly, Griffiths et al. (2000) find that the total
trading cost, measured by implementation shortfall, is less for large-
cap stock than those for small-cap stock in the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Griffiths et al. (2000) and Wagner and Edwards (1993) show that an
order's filled rate is lower for small-cap stocks than for large-cap stocks,
which leads to higher opportunity costs for trades in smaller stocks.
Therefore, a limit order's overall trading cost is higher among small
capitalization firms. In addition, Huang and Stoll (2001) reports
negative relationship between bid–ask spread and stock price. We
expect negative association between trading cost and stock price. All
these arguments lead to our third and fourth hypotheses.
H3. Total trading cost is negatively correlated to firm size.
H4. Total trading cost is negatively correlated to stock price.
Foucault's (1999)model predicts that the posted spread is positively
related to stock return volatility in a limit order market. The reason
given is that high return volatility increases the probability of a limit
order being picked off, thus leading a limit order trader to post a less at-
tractive offer. In otherwords, the bid–ask spreadwidens and the trading
cost for market order increases. Limit orders consequently become
more frequent than market orders. Note that while the proportion of
limit orders in the order flow increases with stock volatility, the limit
order filled rate decreases with stock volatility. In addition, the adverse
price change of the unexecuted portion of a limit order is likely to be
large when stock volatility increases. As a result, the price impact of a
market order and the opportunity cost of a limit order become larger
because of the wider bid–ask spread. Copeland and Galai (1983) also
show that the bid–ask spread is a positive function of return volatility
since the spread can be characterized as a combination of a put and
a call option, i.e., a straddle, arising from limit orders. Ho and Stoll
(1981) illustrate that spread increases in stock price volatility. These
arguments lead to our fifth hypothesis.
H5. Total trading cost is positively correlated to stock price volatility.
The total trading cost is related to the stock liquidity because illiquid
stock tends to have higher price impact and lower order filled rate.
Wagner and Edwards (1993) show that illiquid stocks have higher
unfilled rates and, therefore, higher opportunity costs. Bessembinder
and Kaufman (1997a, 1997b), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), and Keim
and Madhavan (1997, 1998) show that the price impact cost is high
among the illiquid stocks. We posit the relationship between total cost
of trading and stock liquidity in the following hypothesis.
H6. Total trading cost is negatively correlated to stock liquidity.
2.2. Optimal order submission strategy
Harris (1998) takes the opportunity cost of not transacting into
account and develops a model that suggests placing limit order close
to the market is the optimal trading strategy. Using a sample of the
NYSE SuperDOT orders, Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) provide empirical
evidence that limit orders submitted at the best quotes have the lowest
total trading cost. They employ the implementation shortfall developed
by Perold (1988) as the measure of total trading cost in the study.
Griffiths et al. (2000) conclude to a similar optimal trading strategy for
stocks traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. However, NYSE and
Toronto Stock Exchange have market makers in place to facilitate
trading. The Stock Exchange of Thailand, on the other hand, uses a
centralized electronic auto-matching system that does not require any
designated market maker. This study examines whether the optimal
order submission strategy reported for the NYSE and the Toronto
Stock Exchange is applicable to a pure order-driven market adopted
by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Consistent with prior findings, we
hypothesize the following:
H7. Total trading cost is minimized by submitting limit orders at the
best bid (for buy) or best ask (for sell).
3. Data and variable construction
3.1. Institutional background
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (hereafter SET) is a pure order-
drivenmarketwithout any designatedmarketmakers. Both limit orders
and market orders are allowed on the SET but all orders expire at the
end of the trading day. Trading on the SET occurs on five trading boards:
main, foreign, big lot, odd lot, and special. Common stocks, preferred
stocks, warrants, and unit trusts are traded on the main board, big lot
board, and odd lot board. Each board lot size is 100 shares except for
higher priced stocks8 for which one board lot is 50 shares. Orders of
incomplete board lots are traded on the odd lot board, while orders of
either more than 3 million baht or 1 million shares are traded on the
big lot board. Trading on the SET occurs primarily through an order
queuing process that arranges orders according to a price-time priority.
Call market matching is used to determine the opening price in the
morning and afternoon sessions and the closing price of a day. The last
transaction price, traded volume, and the best five bid and ask prices
8 Higher priced stocks are defined as stocks trading at 500 baht or above for six consec-
utive months.
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along with the corresponding depths of the order book are revealed
continuously to the public. The identity of the trader remains anony-
mous to the public.
3.2. Data
The data used in this study are proprietary and provided by the SET.9
The data contain an order file and a trade file from January 2011 to June
2011. The trade file contains information on transaction date, transac-
tion time, traded price, traded volume in shares, unique trade identifica-
tion (trade ID), and corresponding counterparty orders. The order file
contains information on the order submission date, order time, price,
volume, and unique order identification (order ID). The order file pro-
vided by the SET contains not only the best bid and ask orders, but all
the submitted orders. Therefore, we are able not only to reconstruct
the full limit order book from the order and trade files, but also to define
aggressiveness of each order given the condition on the current order
book.Most importantly, we can trace the executed and unfilled portions
of a specific order with the unique order ID. This feature enables us to
compute the opportunity cost of the unfilled portion of an order along
with the price impact of the executed portion of the same order.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) argue that displayed
prices for thinly traded stocks are not informative. Therefore, we include
only the constituent stocks of the SET100 index to ensure that the
constructed limit order book is informative and updated frequently.
The main criteria used in selecting the stocks into SET100 index are
market capitalization and trading volume. These constituent stocks are
shares of the largest firms with the most trading liquidity. Although
the number of stocks covered is about 20% of the companies listed on
the SET, they represent approximately 80% of the market capitalization
and trading volume of the exchange.
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) suggest that comparison of the perfor-
mance of buy and sell orders during periods of sharply rising or falling
trends is not meaningful. Therefore, we select a period that the days
with positive returns are approximately equal to those with negative
returns. In our sample period from January 2011 to June 2011, 56 of
the 119 days in the sample period have negative market returns. We
also use an alternative period from October to December 2009 as a
robustness check.
3.3. Aggressiveness level classification
Wecompute order aggressiveness based on Biais, Hillion, and Spatt's
(1995) classification system. All orders are classified into one of the
seven levels of aggressiveness. A Category 7 buy (sell) order is the
most aggressive level because the order price is greater (lesser) than
the best ask (bid) price, and the size of the order exceeds the depth at
the best ask (bid). A Category 6 order is the second-most aggressive
level because its price is equal to the best ask (bid), but the size of the
order exceeds the depth at the best ask (bid). A Category 5 buy (sell)
order is an order with a price that is equal to or even greater (less)
than the best ask (bid), and the size of the order is smaller than the
best ask (bid) depth. Although Categories 5–7 are market orders and
are executed immediately, only orders under Category 5 are executed
in full, while orders under Categories 6 and 7 are executed in part.
Categories 1 to 4 are essentially limit orders not executed immedi-
ately. Category 4 orders have prices that lie between the best bid and
ask and form a new best quote. Category 3 buy (sell) orders have prices
equal to the best bid (ask). Category 2 buy (sell) orders have prices less
(greater) than the best bid (ask) but greater (less) than thefifth best bid
(ask).10 Category 1 buy (sell) orders have prices less (greater) than the
fifth best bid (ask). Category 1 orders are not visible to traders because
only the best five quotes are visible to the public. Nevertheless, we are
able to identify Category 1 orders because the data provided by the
SET contain all orders including those placed outside the best five
quotes. A recent study by Garvey and Wu (2011) finds that informed
traders strategically switch across different levels of aggressiveness to
minimize their trading cost.
3.4. Price impact calculation
Following Griffiths et al. (2000), the price impact of an order is mea-
sured as the percentage change from the true or unperturbed value of a
security to the volume-weighted average executed price of the shares
filling the order. The pre-trade benchmark price is used as a proxy for
the true value of a security and is themid-point of the quotes prevailing
at the time of order submission. Specifically, the price impact (PI) is
defined as follows:
PI = log(avprice/midquote) for a buy order
PI = log(midquote/avprice) for a sell order
where PI represents the price impact of an order, avprice refers to the
volume-weighted average of the prices of the shares filling the order,
and midquote stands for the mid-point quote immediately before an
order is submitted.
3.5. Opportunity cost calculation
When a market order is submitted, execution is almost guaranteed.
Unlike a market order, a limit order encounters non-execution risk.
Unexecuted and partially executed limit orders cannot be neglected be-
cause they represent the opportunity cost of foregone trades.We follow
the method employed by Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) to compute the
opportunity cost of the unfilled portion of an order. Specifically, if an
order is not filled completely, we assume that it is possibly executed
at the closing ask price for buy orders and at the closing bid price for
sell orders.11 If the size of the unfilled portion exceeds the depth of
the closing bid or ask price, the portion in excess of the available
depth is assumed to be filled completely at the next minimum tick
size step. Thus, this method implicitly assumes that an investor is pre-
committed to trade in the stocks. A similar approach is used for canceled
orders. The canceled portion of a buy (sell) order is assumed to be filled
at the best ask (bid) price prevailing at the time of cancelation. As in the
case of expired orders, the size of the canceled portion of an order is also
taken into account.12
The approach of assigning a filled price to the unexecuted portion of
a limit order is equivalent to assuming that the unfilled portion is
resubmitted by a market order at the time of order cancelation or
expiration.13 This approach is appropriate for pre-committed traders
who use limit orders to lower their trading costs but they must trade
before a certain deadline (e.g., within a day). Furthermore, it is not
possible tomeasure the trading cost for a very large order that usesmul-
tiple split orders because the originally desired size is not known.
Ainsworth and Lee (2014) find that traders become more aggressive
9 There are few studies that utilize order-level from pure order-driven developingmar-
kets. Using data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Jain and Jiang (2014) find that infor-
mation contained in the limit order book may predict future price volatility. Wang,
Chiao, and Chang (2012) and Chiao, Wang, and Lai (2009) use order-level data from the
Taiwan Stock Exchange to study order submission behaviors across different investor
groups.
10 Thefifth best quote is used as the cutoff point because it is the last quote that is shown
on the screen and visible to all participants on the SET.
11 On the SET, orders that are not completely filled at the end of the trading day will ex-
pire automatically.
12 If the size of the canceledportion of a buy (sell) order exceeds the depth of the best ask
(bid) price prevailing at the point of cancelation, the portion in excess of the available
depth is assumed to be fully filled at the next step price.
13 Somemay argue that assuming a market order always executes against the opposite-
side quote overstates the true economic loss because market orders often execute at
inside-quote prices. This concern is not applicable on the SET because market orders al-
ways execute at the quoted prices.
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before an ex-dividend deadline because of the higher opportunity
cost of not transacting. However, we do not include this event-specific
opportunity cost because we are more concerned with the cross-
sectional rather than time-series differences.
3.6. Implementation shortfall calculation
We adopt the implementation shortfall measure proposed by Perold
(1988) as the key measure of total trading cost. The implementation
shortfall measure contains both the execution cost component and the
opportunity cost component. Specifically, the implementation shortfall
is calculated as the sum of the price impact of the filled portion of an
order and the opportunity cost of the unfilled portion of an order.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics of order classification
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the order classifications.
The total number of orders is distributed evenly among buy and sell
orders with a total of 9.47 million orders during the sample period of
119 trading days. The average number of orders submitted per day is
just above 80,000. Close to 80% of orders are limit orders, i.e., orders
under Categories L1–L4, and the rest are market orders, i.e., orders
under Categories M5–M7. Category L2 orders are the most frequently
used, constituting roughly 39% of all orders, and Category L3 orders
come in second, constituting approximately 31% of all orders. Category
M5 and L1 orders are the third and fourthmost frequent types of orders,
constituting 19% and 10% of all orders, respectively. CategoryM7 and L4
orders are the two least frequent types of orders, constituting only 0.03%
and 0.14% of all orders, respectively. Note that the average size of a firm
that attracts Category M7 and L4 orders is just slightly over 50,000
million baht, which is substantially smaller than the size of firms that
are attracted to other categories. This suggests that Category M7 and
L4 orders are more prevalent among small and less-liquid stocks.
Although the twomost aggressive types of order (CategoriesM7 and
M6) represent only 0.03% and 1.35% of all orders submitted, they,
having a much larger order size and higher order filled rate, constitute
approximately 8.5% of the total traded volume (see Table 1, column
5). These two most aggressive orders are more prevalent among the
smaller firms. The average size of firms that attract Category M7 and
M6 orders is 53,008 and 77,330 million baht, respectively, while the
average size of firms that attract other types of order, except Category
L4, is more than 100,000 million baht.
The average percentage of filled rate for limit order categories
declines as order aggressiveness decreases (i.e., from Category L4 to
Category L1). Specifically, for limit orders placed at the best quotes
(Category L3), approximately half of them are executed. The filled rate
drops significantly when an order is priced away from the best quotes
(i.e., Categories L2 and L1). The low execution rate of limit orders
indicates that limit order traders face a substantial non-execution risk.
4.2. Univariate analysis on determinants of trading costs
Table 2 presents the trading cost of orders. Panel A reports the imple-
mentation shortfall for all aggressiveness levels across different order
and firm characteristics while Panels B and C disclose the price impact
of the executed portion of an order and the opportunity cost of the
unexecuted portion of an order. The total trading cost proxied by imple-
mentation shortfall has a U-shaped relation with order aggressiveness.
The implementation shortfall is the highest among the most and the
least aggressive order (M7 = 0.54%, L1 = 0.35%), and is the lowest for
limit orders submitted at the best quotes (L3 = 0.02%). The results in
Panels B and C reveal that the price impact is positively associated
with order aggressiveness, while the opportunity cost is negatively
correlated with order aggressiveness. The result is consistent with our
prediction in H1 that the relation between price impact and order
aggressiveness is positive. The U-shaped relationship between
implementation shortfall and order aggressiveness is a natural result
of combining price impact and opportunity cost. The overall pattern is
intuitive: aggressive orders cause higher a price impact because they
move prices; but they face a lower opportunity cost because of a higher
order filled rate. On the other hand, less aggressiveness orders have a
lower price impact but face substantial opportunity cost.
The univariate results in Table 2 confirm hypotheses H2–H6. The
total trading cost proxied by implementation shortfall is positively
correlated to order size (H2) and volatility (H5); and it is negatively as-
sociated to firm size (H3), stock price (H4), and stock liquidity proxied
by trading value (H6). The differences in trading cost between large/
high and small/low groups are not only statistically significant uncondi-
tionally for all stocks, but also significant conditional on most levels of
order aggressiveness. While the different order aggressiveness levels
exhibit a similar cross-sectional pattern in total trading cost stated in
H2–H6, the patterns in price impact and opportunity cost vary with
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for order classifications. This table presents the descriptive statistics of all orders used in the study. The orders are from top 100 stocks listed on the Stock Exchange of
Thailand (SET). All orders are classified into one of the seven order aggressiveness levels. M7 orders aremarket buy (sell) orderswith an order price higher (lower) than the best ask (bid)
price and an order size larger than the shares available at the ask (bid).M6 orders aremarket buy (sell) orderswith an order size larger than shares available at ask (bid) and an order price
equal to the price at the ask (bid).M5orders aremarket buy (sell) orderswith order prices equal to the best ask (bid) andvolumes smaller than theprevailing ask (bid) depth. L4 orders are
limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices higher (lower) than the best bid (ask) price but lower (higher) than the best ask (bid) prices. L3 orders are limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices
equal to the best bid (ask) prices. L2 orders are limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) price but higher (lower) than thefifth best bid (ask) prices. L1
orders are limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices lower (higher) than thefifth best bid (ask) prices. Thefigures in columns 2 to 8 are calculated from all submitted orders that include the
fully executed, partially executed, and unexecuted orders. Thefigures in columns 9 to 11 describe the disposition of executed orders only. Relative order size is calculated using the ratio of










































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
M7 3185 0.03% 209,558 0.19% 2.40% 99.41% 53,008 14.5 0.0 1.4
M6 128,241 1.35% 227,340 8.42% 1.36% 93.04% 77,330 10.9 0.0 10.9
M5 1,826,619 19.28% 36,862 19.45% 0.16% 100.00% 112,305 2.0 0.0 0.0
L4 13,078 0.14% 17,584 0.07% 0.70% 73.21% 50,692 2.4 9.3 17.1
L3 2,914,222 30.76% 39,584 33.31% 0.18% 50.02% 118,062 1.7 44.1 48.0
L2 3,647,902 38.50% 30,720 32.36% 0.16% 11.86% 121,158 1.3 143.7 147.3
L1 940,907 9.93% 22,809 6.20% 0.14% 1.96% 140,457 1.3 225.9 231.9
Total 9,474,154 100.00% 36,549 100.00% 0.18% 48.14% 119,702 2.0 42.6 45.1
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the order types. The price impact of market orders (M5–M7) is higher
for large orders, small firm stocks, low priced stocks, stocks with high
volatility, or stocks with low liquidity. The opposite is also true for
limit orders (L1–L4). For the opportunity cost, the differences between
large/high and small/low groups are not statistically significant for
market orders (M5–M7) as most of these orders are executed in full.
On the other hand, the opportunity cost of limit orders (L1–L4) is higher
for stocks associated with a small firm, a low price, high volatility, and
low liquidity. Our finding on the relation between components of trad-
ing cost and firm size is consistent to Wagner and Edwards (1993).
We also study the relation between order filled rate and stock or
order characteristics across all order aggressiveness levels. From
Table 3, the filled rate decreases as order aggressiveness decreases.
Even for a limit order that matches the best quote (Category L3), 39%
of the order is not filled. When the limit order is priced away from the
best quotes, more than 80% of the order remains unfilled (Categories
L1 and L2). Limit order traders encounter a considerable non-execution
risk which leads to a substantial opportunity cost. Large volume orders
have a higher unfilled rate, reflecting the difficulty in locating sufficient
shares to complete large orders. Orders for small firms or illiquid stocks
have a higher unfilled rate. Finally, neither stock volatility nor stock
price has a clear relationship with the order unfilled rate.
On top of the order filled rate, adverse price changes also affect the
opportunity cost. Adverse price changes measure the cost of adverse
selection arising from the nature of options embedded in limit orders.
When a limit order to buy (sell) is placed, the market is given a free
put (call) option. The adverse price change captures the adverse selec-
tion cost through the trades that the market chooses not to transact.
The results suggest that the adverse selection problem associated with
an unfilled portion of orders is more severe in stocks associated with a
small firm, a low price, high volatility, and low liquidity. Finally, a
large order faces a higher adverse selection problem.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, a limit order has a higher total trading
cost measured by the implementation shortfall for stocks associated
with a large order size, small firms, low prices, high volatility, and
illiquidity. However, the opposite relationship exists for the price
impact cost in Panel B. Although an executed limit order attracts a
higher immediacy price for a certain group of stocks, the opportunity
cost is comparatively larger and outweighs the favorable price impact
of the executed portion. Thus, the total trading cost ismainly dominated
by opportunity cost in the case of a limit order.
4.3. Multivariate analyses on determinants of trading costs
We conduct the following cross-sectional regression to test
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Trading cost of orders. This table compares the total trading cost and its components across different order and firm characteristics. Panel A presents the total trading cost measured by
implementation shortfall. Panel B presents the price impact cost for executed orders. Panel C presents the opportunity cost for unfilled portion of orders. The orders are from top 100 stocks
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). All orders are classified into one of the seven order aggressiveness levels described in Table 1. M7 is themost aggressive order and L1 is the
least aggressive order. Price impact for buy (sell) orders is defined as the (minus of) the logarithm of the ratio of the volume-weighted average of the executed prices to the mid-point
quote prevailing at the time of order submission. The opportunity cost is calculatedusing theproduct of the percentage of unfilled rate and the adverse price change for each corresponding
cell. Adverse price changes for buy (sell) orders are defined as the (minus of) the logarithmof the ratio of the best ask (bid) price at the expiration/cancelation time to themid-point quote
at the time of order submission. Implementation shortfall is sumof the price impact of the filled portion of an order and the opportunity cost of the unfilled portion part of an order. Orders
are partitioned into three groups according to order size,firm size, stock price, volatility, or liquidity. Order size is the number of shares in the order divided by 5-daymoving average trad-
ing volume of the stock. Firm size is the averagemarket capitalization in year 2010 (before sample period). Stock price is the closing price at the end of year 2010. Volatility is the standard
deviation of the daily stock return in year 2010. Liquidity ismeasured by average daily trading value in year 2010. The trading costs for the small/low and large/high are reported. The L–S
and H–L are the differences between large and small groups or between high and low groups. * and ** denote the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. All figures including the
trading cost measures are in percentage. The sample period is from January 2011 to June 2011.
Aggressiveness Order size Firm size Stock price Volatility Liquidity (trading value)
All Small Large L–S Small Large L–S Low High H–L Low High H–L Low High H–L
Panel A: Implementation shortfall of all orders
M7 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.03 0.58 0.44 −0.14** 0.60 0.46 −0.15** 0.44 0.62 0.18** 0.57 0.51 −0.06**
M6 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.01* 0.33 0.25 −0.08** 0.35 0.23 −0.11** 0.24 0.34 0.11** 0.31 0.27 −0.04**
M5 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.03** 0.34 0.26 −0.08** 0.38 0.23 −0.15** 0.21 0.37 0.16** 0.31 0.29 −0.02**
L4 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05** 0.08 0.04 −0.05** 0.08 0.05 −0.03** 0.05 0.07 0.02* 0.08 0.03 −0.05**
L3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 −0.01** 0.05 0.00 −0.05** 0.02 0.03 0.01** 0.04 0.02 −0.02**
L2 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.08** 0.27 0.18 −0.10** 0.34 0.12 −0.22** 0.13 0.31 0.18** 0.25 0.21 −0.03**
L1 0.35 0.31 0.42 0.11** 0.47 0.26 −0.21** 0.51 0.23 −0.28** 0.21 0.51 0.30** 0.37 0.32 −0.05**
All 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.03** 0.23 0.15 −0.08** 0.27 0.12 −0.15** 0.12 0.25 0.13** 0.21 0.18 −0.03**
Panel B: Price impact of executed orders
M7 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.03 0.58 0.44 −0.14** 0.60 0.46 −0.15** 0.44 0.62 0.18** 0.57 0.51 −0.06**
M6 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.01* 0.32 0.25 −0.07** 0.34 0.23 −0.11** 0.23 0.34 0.10** 0.30 0.27 −0.03**
M5 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.03** 0.34 0.26 −0.08** 0.38 0.23 −0.15** 0.21 0.37 0.16** 0.31 0.29 −0.02**
L4 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01*1 −0.02 −0.01 0.02** −0.02 −0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.00 0.02**
L3 −0.31 −0.30 −0.33 −0.03** −0.34 −0.27 0.08** −0.39 −0.23 0.16** −0.21 −0.38 −0.17** −0.31 −0.30 0.02**
L2 −1.18 −1.14 −1.24 −0.11** −1.42 −1.02 0.40** −1.51 −0.91 0.60** −0.85 −1.47 −0.62** −1.22 −1.11 0.11**
L1 −2.82 −2.72 −3.10 −0.39** −3.79 −2.24 1.55** −3.89 −2.19 1.70** −2.11 −3.92 −1.81** −3.27 −2.59 0.68**
All −0.20 −0.23 −0.14 0.09** −0.22 −0.20 0.02** −0.22 −0.19 0.04** −0.17 −0.22 −0.05** −0.14 −0.21 −0.07**
Panel C: Opportunity cost of unfilled portion of orders
M7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M6 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 −0.01
M5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
L4 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 −0.06** 0.09 0.06 −0.03** 0.06 0.08 0.02** 0.09 0.03 −0.06**
L3 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.24 0.18 −0.06** 0.28 0.14 −0.14** 0.15 0.26 0.11** 0.23 0.20 −0.03**
L2 0.47 0.47 0.46 −0.01 0.58 0.40 −0.18** 0.61 0.34 −0.27** 0.33 0.59 0.25** 0.46 0.45 −0.01**
L1 0.43 0.41 0.47 0.06** 0.60 0.33 −0.27** 0.61 0.30 −0.31** 0.29 0.60 0.31** 0.47 0.40 −0.06**
All 0.29 0.29 0.27 −0.02** 0.35 0.25 −0.10** 0.38 0.21 −0.17** 0.21 0.36 0.15** 0.28 0.28 0.00**
1 Note that the difference of −0.01 is the rounded value of −0.008, which comes from−0.013− (−0.005).
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where Yi denotes one of the threemeasures of trading cost (implementa-
tion shortfall, price impact, or opportunity cost); Ii,j is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the aggressiveness (Agg) of order i is Category j and 0
otherwise, where j takes a value from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, j = 1 is the
most passive order, and j = 7 is the most aggressive order; Buyi is a
dummy variablewith a value of 1 if order i is a buy order and 0 otherwise;
Firmsizei is the natural logarithm of the averagemarket capitalization of a
firm in year 2010 (before the sample period); Volatilityi is the standard
deviation of the daily return of a stock in year 2010; PriceInversei is the in-
verse of a stock price defined as 100 times the inverse of the mid-point
quote prevailing at the time of order submission; Ordersizei is the order
size divided by the average daily trading volume over the recent 5 trading
days; AvTrdVali is the average daily trading value of a stock in year 2010;
and cj denotes the coefficient of each explanatory variable.
Our multivariate analyses employ three different cross-sectional
regressions to test hypotheses H1–H6 while controlling for other
factors.14 We also use three different measures of trading cost. In
Table 4, Panel A reports the results using implementation shortfall as
the dependent variable; Panel B uses price impact as the dependent var-
iable; and Panel C uses opportunity cost as the dependent variable. The
overall result is very similar to the univariate analysis. From coefficients
c1 to c7, we find that the implementation shortfall has a U-shaped rela-
tionwith order aggressiveness. The price impact is positively correlated
with order aggressiveness and opportunity cost is negatively associated
with order aggressiveness. The finding provides further confirmation of
our prediction inH1 that price impact is positively correlatedwith order
aggressiveness.
The multivariate results in Table 4 further confirm prediction of
hypothesesH2–H6. In Panel A of Table 4, the total trading cost is positive-
ly correlated to order size (H2, coefficients c29–c35) and volatility (H5, co-
efficients c22–c28); and it is negatively associated to firm size (H3,
coefficients c15–c21), stock price (H4, coefficients c36–c42), and stock li-
quidity proxied by trading value (H6, coefficients c43–c49). We control
for the order type in the multivariate analysis and find that buy orders
have a lower total trading cost than do sell orders (coefficients c8–c14).
While the different order aggressiveness levels exhibit a similar
cross-sectional pattern in the total trading cost stated in H2–H6, the
patterns of price impact and opportunity cost vary with the order type.
From Panel B of Table 4, the price impact of a market order is positively
correlated with stock volatility, and is negatively correlated with firm
size and liquidity. The opposite correlation exists for a limit order. How-
ever, we find that the price impact for both market and limit orders are
positively correlated with order size, and negatively correlated with
stock price. In Panel C of Table 4, the opportunity cost for both types
of order is positively correlated with order size and volatility and is
negatively correlated with firm size, stock price, and stock liquidity.
In summary, themultivariate results resemble the univariate results
shown in Table 2. Some of the price impact and the opportunity cost
cross-sectional variations in order type disappear in the multivariate
analysis. The behavior of total trading cost proxied by implementation
shortfall remains unchanged despite the presence of additional control
variables. From the intercept coefficient c3, we find that the limit order
at the best quote (L3) has the lowest total trading cost among all
order aggressiveness levels, confirming H7 in a multivariate setting.
4.4. Optimal order submission strategy
Table 3 shows that there is a substantial opportunity cost for the
unexecuted portion of a limit order. The cost of the unexecuted portion
is a function of the unfilled rate of a limit order and adverse price change
of the stocks. Table 3 demonstrates that, for a limit order (order with an
aggressiveness level of L1 to L4), a favorable price impact is always
offset by a larger opportunity cost. The total cost of trading measured
by implementation shortfall is positive.
Table 3 shows that a limit order with aggressiveness level L3 has the
lowest total trading cost. This result supports our hypothesis H7. The
total cost of trading using Category L3 orders is 0.02%, whereas the
total cost of trading ranges from 0.06% to 0.54% for the remaining
types of order. In addition, Table 4 shows that, after controlling for
various types of stock characteristics and order sizes, Category L3 orders
still offer the lowest overall trading cost.15 Traders who wish to
minimize their trading cost would do well by submitting a buy (sell)
limit order priced at the best bid (ask).
5. Robustness
To ascertain the relationships found in the previous sections, we
conduct robustness checks on an earlier dataset from October 20,
14 To avoid multicollinearity among control variables, we only include one of the three
highly correlated variables in the multiple regression model: FirmSize, Volatility, and
AvTrdVal.
15 In themultivariate analyses, the total trading cost amongvarious aggressiveness levels
is compared by simultaneously controlling for differences in stock/order characteristics,
and this comparison shows that Categories L3 and L4 orders incur the lowest total trading
cost after these differences are controlled.
Table 3
Analysis on total trading cost. This table presents breakdown of the implementation shortfall cost of all orders submitted on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). All orders are classified
into one of the seven order aggressiveness levels. M7 orders aremarket buy (sell) orders with an order price higher (lower) than the best ask (bid) price and an order size larger than the
shares available at the ask (bid).M6 orders aremarket buy (sell) orderswith an order size larger than shares available at ask (bid) and an order price equal to the price at the ask (bid).M5
orders are market buy (sell) orders with order prices equal to the best ask (bid) and volumes smaller than the prevailing ask (bid) depth. L4 orders are limit buy (sell) orders with order
prices higher (lower) than the best bid (ask) price but lower (higher) than the best ask (bid) prices. L3 orders are limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices equal to the best bid (ask) prices.
L2 orders are limit buy (sell) orderswith order prices lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) price but higher (lower) than thefifth best bid (ask) prices. L1 orders are limit buy (sell) orders
with order prices lower (higher) than thefifth best bid (ask) prices. Price impact for buy (sell) orders is defined as the (minus of) the logarithmof the ratio of the volume-weighted average
of the executed prices to themid-point quote prevailing at the time of order submission. The cost of the filled portion is the product of the percentage of orders filled and the price impact.
Adverse price changes for buy (sell) orders are defined as the (minus of) the logarithm of the ratio of the best ask (bid) price at the expiration/cancelation time to the mid-point quote at
the time of order submission. The cost of the unfilled portion (i.e., opportunity cost) is the product of the percentage of the unfilled rate and the percentage of adverse price changes. Im-
plementation shortfall is defined as the sum of the cost of the filled portion and opportunity cost. All figures including the trading cost measures are in percentage. The sample period is

















M7 99.74 0.54 0.54 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.54
M6 95.27 0.30 0.28 4.73 0.41 0.02 0.30
M5 100.00 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.31
L4 82.40 −0.01 −0.01 17.60 0.40 0.07 0.06
L3 61.22 −0.31 −0.19 38.78 0.54 0.21 0.02
L2 20.63 −1.18 −0.24 79.37 0.59 0.47 0.22
L1 2.91 −2.82 −0.08 97.09 0.44 0.43 0.35
All 47.78 −0.20 −0.10 52.22 0.55 0.29 0.19
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2009 to December 30, 2009 using a similar analysis. The number of days
with a negative market return is 28 while the number of days with a
positive market return is 21. The numbers of negative return days and
positive return days are approximately balanced despite the time period
being just after the 2008 global financial crisis. The full results of the ro-
bustness checks are qualitatively similar to themain results.We present
Table 4
Multivariate analyses of trading cost of orders. This table presents the coefficients (multiplied by 100) of three GMM regression analyses. Each regression model is a variation of the full
model shownbelow. Inpanel A, the dependent variable is the implementation shortfall of all orders. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the price impact of executed orders. In Panel C, the
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where Yi denotes one of the three measures of trading costs (Implementation Shortfall [ISi], Price Impact [PIi], or Opportunity Cost [OCi]). ISi is the implementation shortfall of order i; PIi is
price impact of order that equals to ln(Pi/Mi) for buys orders and ln(Mi/Pi) for sell orderswhere Pi is the volume-weighted average of the tradeprice for order i andMi is themid-point quote
immediately before the submission of order i; OCi is the opportunity cost of order i; Ii,j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the aggressiveness (Agg) of order i is Category j and 0 otherwise,
where j takes a value from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, j=1 is themost passive order, and j=7 is themost aggressive order;Buyi is a dummyvariable equal to 1 if order i a buy order and 0 otherwise;
Firmsizei is the natural logarithm of the averagemarket capitalization of a firm in year 2010 (before the sample period); Volatilityi is the standard deviation of the daily return of a stock in
year 2010; PriceInversei is the inverse of a stock price defined as 100 times the inverse of themid-point quote prevailing at the time of order submission (100/Mi);Ordersizei is the order size
divided by the average daily trading volume over the recent 5 trading days; AvTrdVali is the average daily trading value of a stock in year 2010; and cj denotes the coefficient of each
explanatory variable. Adjusted R2 and the number of observations (orders) used in themultivariate analysis are reported. * and ** denote the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively.
The sample period is from January 2011 to June 2011.
Panel A: Implementation shortfall Panel B: Price impact Panel C: Opportunity cost
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
c1 Agg1 1.654** 1.137** 0.135** −0.466** −0.223** −0.020** 2.117** 1.357** 0.155**
c2 Agg2 0.935** 0.723** 0.168** −0.848** −0.486** −0.093** 1.779** 1.205** 0.261**
c3 Agg3 −0.090** 0.018** 0.080** −0.653** −0.500** −0.076** 0.567** 0.522** 0.156**
c4 Agg4 0.402** 0.303** 0.025* −0.147** −0.111** −0.005 0.597** 0.443** 0.036**
c5 Agg5 0.851** 0.762** 0.160** 0.851** 0.762** 0.160**
c6 Agg6 0.836** 0.712** 0.181** 0.769** 0.651** 0.177** 0.190** 0.160** 0.021**
c7 Agg7 1.735** 1.236** 0.399** 1.741** 1.246** 0.399** 0.004 0.014 0.000
c8 Buy1 −0.246** −0.252** −0.258** −0.028** −0.026** −0.027** −0.219** −0.226** −0.231**
c9 Buy2 −0.188** −0.190** −0.190** −0.040** −0.039** −0.042** −0.148** −0.151** −0.148**
c10 Buy3 −0.095** −0.095** −0.094** −0.023** −0.023** −0.024** −0.073** −0.072** −0.070**
c11 Buy4 −0.025** −0.026** −0.026** −0.006** −0.005** −0.005** −0.027** −0.028** −0.027**
c12 Buy5 −0.002** −0.001** 0.001** −0.002** −0.001** 0.001**
c13 Buy6 −0.005** −0.005** −0.005** −0.002** −0.002** −0.001 −0.003* −0.003* −0.003*
c14 Buy7 −0.165** −0.167** −0.159** −0.166** −0.168** −0.160** −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
c15 FirmSize1 −0.051** 0.016** −0.066**
c16 FirmSize2 −0.027** 0.025** −0.052**
c17 FirmSize3 0.006** 0.020** −0.014**
c18 FirmSize4 −0.014** 0.006** −0.022**
c19 FirmSize5 −0.024** −0.024**
c20 FirmSize6 −0.023** −0.021** −0.006**
c21 FirmSize7 −0.049** −0.049** 0.000
c22 Volatility1 0.813** −0.141** 0.953**
c23 Volatility2 0.380** −0.348** 0.728**
c24 Volatility3 −0.023** −0.268** 0.244**
c25 Volatility4 0.116** −0.007 0.138**
c26 Volatility5 0.376** 0.376**
c27 Volatility6 0.295** 0.292** 0.034**
c28 Volatility7 0.510** 0.513** 0.004
c29 OrderSize1 1.292** 1.280** 2.400** 0.805** 0.743** 0.588** 0.470** 0.522** 1.794**
c30 OrderSize2 1.054** 0.998** 1.845** 1.566** 1.513** 1.300** −0.544** −0.545** 0.513**
c31 OrderSize3 1.120** 1.086** 1.515** 0.765** 0.895** −0.032 0.344** 0.179** 1.539**
c32 OrderSize4 0.742** 0.720** 0.896** −0.126 −0.114 −0.173 1.028** 0.997** 1.247**
c33 OrderSize5 0.220** −0.014 1.461** 0.220** −0.014 1.461**
c34 OrderSize6 0.449** 0.364** 0.785** 0.310** 0.237** 0.636** 0.874** 0.849** 0.902**
c35 OrderSize7 1.039** 0.986** 1.220** 1.052** 0.998** 1.234** 0.021* 0.019 0.022*
c36 PriceInv1 0.003** 0.005** 0.000** 0.000** 0.003** 0.005**
c37 PriceInv2 0.003** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.003** 0.003**
c38 PriceInv3 0.001** 0.001** −0.001** −0.001** 0.003** 0.003**
c39 PriceInv4 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001**
c40 PriceInv5 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
c41 PriceInv6 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000
c42 PriceInv7 0.002** 0.004** 0.002** 0.004** 0.000 0.000
c43 AvTrdVal1 −0.038** 0.008** −0.046**
c44 AvTrdVal2 −0.023** 0.013** −0.036**
c45 AvTrdVal3 0.002** 0.017** −0.016**
c46 AvTrdVal4 −0.013** 0.006** −0.020**
c47 AvTrdVal5 −0.026** −0.026**
c48 AvTrdVal6 −0.023** −0.021** −0.007**
c49 AvTrdVal7 −0.037** −0.037** −0.001
Adj R-Sq 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.227 0.225 0.222 0.077 0.074 0.071
No. of Obs. 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154 9,474,154
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an analysis on trading cost and compare the results based on these two
periods. Table 5 replicates the results that are comparable to those re-
ported in Table 3.
Across all aggressiveness levels, the percentages of orders filled in
2009 are similar to those in 2011. The magnitudes of price impact in
2009 are also similar to those in 2011. However, the adverse price
changes in 2009 are much larger than those in 2011 which contribute
to the much higher opportunity cost in 2009. Implementation shortfall
has a U-shaped relation with order aggressiveness. The lowest total
trading cost among all aggressiveness levels is from Category L3 with
an implementation shortfall of 0.16%. This is substantially higher than
its value of 0.02% in 2011. The implementation shortfall in 2009 is
much higher across all order aggressiveness in 2009 than it was in
2011. Nonetheless, the results in Table 5 indicate that the best order
submission strategy in terms of the minimal implementation shortfall
is to submit a buy order at the best bid, and a sell order at the best
ask. This is consistent to our 2011 conclusion in support of hypothesis
H7. We also conduct both univariate and multivariate analyses on the
relation between trading cost and order/firm characteristics. The
resulting conclusions are in support of hypotheses H1–H6 and are
qualitatively similar to those of the main results despite the presence
of a higher opportunity cost for limit orders.
In summary, the 2009 results echo the 2011 results and confirm the
relation between each component of the total trading cost and its deter-
minants, as suggested in our seven hypotheses. In addition, the total
trading cost is much higher in 2009 than in 2011 due to the higher
opportunity cost. The sample in year 2009 is from a period with high
uncertainty as it was just after the global financial crisis. We thus
observe a larger adverse price change, resulting in a higher opportunity
cost for unfilled orders.
6. Conclusion
This study examines and quantifies various components of trading
cost incurred when trading in the 100 largest and most liquid stocks
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The results show that more
aggressive orders incur a higher price impact cost because such orders
pay an immediacy price, while less aggressive orders suffer from a
much greater opportunity cost because of a lower filled rate. The total
trading cost measured by implementation shortfall is high for both the
most aggressive orders and the least aggressive orders. The total trading
cost is observed to be the lowest for limit orders submitted at the best
bid or at the best ask prices. Our empirical results highlight the impor-
tance of opportunity cost as it constitutes a large portion of the total
trading cost. In addition, we identify five factors that have a significant
impact on the total trading cost.
This study suggests that, because it takes into account the opportuni-
ty cost of the unfilled portion of an order, implementation shortfall
should be used to measure the total trading cost for comparing the cost
of orders across various order aggressiveness levels. We demonstrate
that the optimal order submission strategy is to use a limit order submit-
ted at the best quote.
References
Ainsworth, A., & Lee, A.D. (2014). Waiting costs and limit order book liquidity: Evidence
from the ex-dividend deadline in Australia. Journal of Financial Markets, 20, 101–128.
Bennett, P., &Wei, L. (2006). Market structure, fragmentation, and market quality. Journal
of Financial Markets, 9, 49–78.
Berkman, H., Brailsford, T., & Frino, A. (2005). A note on execution costs for stock index
futures: Information versus liquidity effects. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29,
565–577.
Bessembinder, H. (2003). Issues in assessing trade execution costs. Journal of Financial
Markets, 6, 233–257.
Bessembinder, H., & Kaufman, H.M. (1997a). A comparison of trade execution costs for
NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32,
287–310.
Bessembinder, H., & Kaufman, H.M. (1997b). A cross-exchange comparison of execution
costs and information flow for NYSE-listed stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 46,
293–319.
Biais, B., Hillion, P., & Spatt, C. (1995). An empirical analysis of the limit-order book and
the order flow in the Paris Bourse. Journal of Finance, 50, 1655–1689.
Bodurtha, S., & Quin, T. (1990). Does patient program trading really pay? Financial
Analysts Journal, 46, 35–42.
Boehmer, E. (2005). Dimensions of execution quality: Recent evidence for US equity
markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 553–582.
Chan, L., & Lakonishok, J. (1995). The behavior of stock prices around institutional trades.
Journal of Finance, 50, 1147–1174.
Chan, L., & Lakonishok, J. (1997). Institutional equity trading costs: NYSE versus NASDAQ.
Journal of Finance, 52, 713–735.
Chiao, C., Wang, Z.M., & Lai, H.L. (2009). Order submission behaviors and opening price
behaviors: Evidence from an emerging market. Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, 33, 253–278.
Chiyachantana, C.N., Jain, P.K., Jiang, C., &Wood, R.A. (2004). International evidence on in-
stitutional trading behavior and price impact. Journal of Finance, 59, 869–898.
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2000). Commonality in liquidity. Journal of
Financial Economics, 56, 3–28.
Cohen, K., Maier, S., Schwartz, R., & Whitcomb, D. (1981). Transaction costs, order
placement strategy, and existence of the bid–ask spread. Journal of Political
Economy, 89, 287–305.
Cooney, J.W., & Sias, R.W. (2004). Informed trading and order type. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 28, 1711–1743.
Copeland, T., & Galai, D. (1983). Information effects on the bid–ask spread. Journal of
Finance, 38, 1457–1469.
Easley, D., & O'Hara, M. (1987). Price, trade size, and information in securities markets.
Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 69–90.
Foucault, T. (1999). Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order
market. Journal of Financial Markets, 2, 99–134.
Table 5
Analysis on Total Trading Cost (Year 2009). This table presents implementation shortfall breakdown similar to Table 3 using a different sample period as a robustness check. All orders are
classified into one of the seven order aggressiveness levels. M7 orders are market buy (sell) orders with an order price higher (lower) than the best ask (bid) price and an order size larger
than the shares available at the ask (bid). M6 orders are market buy (sell) orders with an order size larger than shares available at ask (bid) and an order price equal to the price at the ask
(bid). M5 orders aremarket buy (sell) orders with order prices equal to the best ask (bid) and volumes smaller than the prevailing ask (bid) depth. L4 orders are limit buy (sell) orders with
order prices higher (lower) than the best bid (ask) price but lower (higher) than the best ask (bid) prices. L3 orders are limit buy (sell) orders with order prices equal to the best bid (ask)
prices. L2 orders are limit buy (sell) orders with order prices lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) price but higher (lower) than the fifth best bid (ask) prices. L1 orders are limit buy (sell)
orders with order prices lower (higher) than the fifth best bid (ask) prices. Price impact for buy (sell) orders is defined as the (minus of) the logarithm of the ratio of the volume-weighted
average of the executed prices to the mid-point quote prevailing at the time of order submission. The cost of the filled portion is the product of the percentage of orders filled and the price
impact. Adverse price changes for buy (sell) orders are defined as the (minus of) the logarithmof the ratio of the best ask (bid) price at the expiration/cancelation time to themid-point quote
at the time of order submission. The cost of the unfilled portion (i.e., opportunity cost) is the product of the percentage of the unfilled rate and the percentage of adverse price changes. Im-
plementation shortfall is defined as the sum of the cost of the filled portion and opportunity cost. All figures including the trading costmeasures are in percentage. The sample period is from

















M7 99.60 0.53 0.53 0.40 2.35 0.01 0.54
M6 94.60 0.32 0.30 5.40 1.38 0.07 0.37
M5 100.00 0.32 0.32 0.00 2.21 0.00 0.32
L4 83.30 −0.02 −0.02 16.70 1.07 0.18 0.16
L3 62.60 −0.32 −0.20 37.40 0.97 0.36 0.16
L2 19.30 −1.20 −0.23 80.70 0.71 0.58 0.34
L1 2.90 −2.86 −0.08 97.10 0.46 0.44 0.36
39N. Jenwittayaroje et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 41 (2015) 31–40
Frino, A., & Oetomo, T. (2005). Slippage in futures markets: Evidence from the Sydney
futures exchange. Journal of Futures Markets, 25, 1129–1146.
Garvey, R., & Wu, F. (2011). Information, speed vs. cost trade-offs, and order routing
decisions in U.S. equity markets. Journal of Empirical Finance, 18, 408–422.
Griffiths, M.D., Smith, B.F., Turnbull, D.A.S., & White, R.W. (2000). The costs and
determinants of order aggressiveness. Journal of Financial Economics, 56, 65–88.
Handa, P., & Schwartz, R.A. (1996). Limit order trading. Journal of Finance, 51, 1835–1861.
Harris, L. (1998). Optimal dynamic order submission strategies in some stylized trading
problems. Financial Markets, Institutions, and Instruments, 7, 1–76.
Harris, L., & Hasbrouck, J. (1996). The SuperDOT evidence on order submission strategy.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 213–231.
Ho, T., & Stoll, H. (1981). Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and return uncertainty.
Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 47–73.
Huang, R.D., & Stoll, H.R. (2001). Tick size, bid–ask spreads, and market structures. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36, 503–522.
Jain, P., & Jiang, C. (2014). Predicting future price volatility: Empirical evidence from an
emerging limit order market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 27, 72–93.
Keim, D.B., & Madhavan, A. (1997). Transactions costs and investment style: An inter-
exchange analysis of institutional equity trades. Journal of Financial Economics, 46,
265–292.
Keim, D.B., & Madhavan, A. (1998). The cost of institutional equity trades. Financial
Analysts Journal, 54, 50–69.
Lee, K.H. (2011). The world price of liquidity risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 99,
136–161.
Liu, W.M. (2009). Monitoring and limit order submission risks. Journal of Financial
Markets, 12, 107–141.
Perold, A.F. (1988). The implementation shortfall: Paper versus reality. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 14, 4–9.
Peterson, M., & Sirri, E. (2002). Order submission strategy and the curious case of market-
able limit orders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37, 221–241.
Peterson, M., & Sirri, E. (2003). Evaluation of the biases in execution cost estimation using
trade and quote data. Journal of Financial Markets, 6, 259–280.
Venkataraman, K. (2001). Automated versus floor trading: An analysis of execution costs
on the Paris and New York exchanges. Journal of Finance, 56, 1445–1488.
Wagner, W., & Edwards, M. (1993). Best execution. Financial Analysts Journal, 49, 65–71.
Wang, Z.M., Chiao, C., & Chang, Y.T. (2012). Technical analyses and order submission
behaviors: Evidence from an emerging market. International Review of Economics &
Finance, 24, 109–128.
Werner, I.M. (2003). NYSE order flow, spreads, and information. Journal of Financial
Markets, 6, 309–335.
40 N. Jenwittayaroje et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 41 (2015) 31–40
